Reports

A sectoral perspective can help the Global Stocktake (GST) to effectively achieve its objective to inform the Parties in enhancing subsequent NDCs and in enhancing international cooperation. Specifically, granular and actionable sectoral lessons, grounded in country-driven assessments, should be identified and elaborated. To be effective, conversations on sectoral transformations need to synthesise key challenges and opportunities identified in the national analyses and link them to international enablers; focus on systemic interdependencies, involve diverse actors, and be thoroughly prepared including by pre-scoping points of convergences and divergence across transformations.

We specifically recommend that the co-facilitators of the Technical Dialogue use their (limited) mandate to facilitate an effective conversation on sectoral transformations e.g. by organising dedicated informal seminars in between formal negotiation sessions; key systemic transformations necessary to achieve net-zero by mid-century should be spelled out and included in the final decision or political declaration of the GST; and the political outcome of the GST should mandate follow-up processes at the regional level and encourage national-level conversations to translate the collective messages from GST into actionable and sector-specific policy recommendations.

This report reflects on the operationalization of sectoral conversations approach which guided the design of the NDC Aspects project. In this way the project acts as a case study of research that aim at integrating science expertise into sustainability governance processes at global levels. Thus, the central aim of the study is to assess how and to what extent the sectoral conversation approach has fostered dialogue and learning among researchers and between researchers and stakeholders. For that aim two strands of analysis are proposed. The first reflects on the evolution of the sectoral conversations that were undertaken along the whole project duration. The second strand of analysis focuses on the structure of the academic research tasks and traces the interactions that were promoted across them. Based on the results lessons learned are extracted that offer guidance about central aspects that should be taken into account in order to promote the effective integration of science in global sustainability governance.

This deliverable is a guidebook to support the successful implementation of the Sectoral Conversations for industry, mobility & transport, buildings, and agriculture, land use, and forestry under the NDC ASPECTS project. The purpose of the Sectoral Conversations is to provide a space for inter- and transdisciplinary exchange within the project and with project-external sectoral experts. It provides an opportunity to share (interim) results from the outset with different disciplines and external stakeholders. Their feedback might help to hone research questions and reconfigure ongoing analyses so that they speak to each other, thus maximizing their policy and academic relevance.

This report presents the development of two international bunker fuel models, for maritime and aviation that can assess the potential contribution of the sectors to meet deep decarbonization goals such as those of the Paris Agreement objectives. The models are calibrated to latest available information. In the short-term both models take into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and include mechanisms that can account for different policies, technologies, and prices. We quantify global and regional scenarios as well as regional case studies to demonstrate the potential contribution of international bunker fuels to GHG mitigation efforts. Then, the report discusses how the modelling of international transport (aviation and shipping) is improved in the global energy model PROMETHEUS, with endogenization of the emission reduction options (e.g., accelerated efficiency and operational improvements, advanced biofuels, clean synthetic fuels, hydrogen). Finally, the enhanced global modelling framework was used to investigate deep decarbonisation pathways and strategies for the international shipping and aviation sectors highlighting feasible policy measures and actions in the relatively short-term and possible enhancements in the longer-term, as well as the synergies of domestic climate action with the decarbonisation of bunker fuels.

This section of the deliverable employs the PRIMES-International Maritime model to address the evolution of the global maritime transport sector under distinct climate policy assumptions and quantified emission reduction trajectories for international maritime bunker fuels, showcasing scenarios for achieving IMO’s net-zero targets and assessing the impact of structural trade changes (close-shoring) on shipping costs and emissions.

The study presents four key findings. First, based on prior academic and policy literature, we establish three categories of potential drivers and barriers to NDC enhancement: political institutions, the economy, and structural factors. Second, we identify the key role of democratic institutions through quantitative and qualitative methods. We find that more democratic countries were more likely to enhance their 2030 emission targets in the updated NDCs. The qualitative part of the deliverable supports this by finding that open and transparent stakeholder consultations were beneficial for the enhancement of greenhouse gas emission targets in updated NDCs. Saudi Arabia, however, is a key outlier as it enhanced its 2030 NDC mitigation target within completely closed decision-making institutions. Third, we establish that government and stakeholder concerns about the potential negative impacts of the green transition constitute a key barrier to continued NDC enhancement. The quantitative analysis shows that governments in countries with high economic fast-growing economies tended to keep their pledges the same or even reduced ambition. Qualitative interviews indicated that this may be due to worries about increasing GHG emissions and the effects of the low emission transition on future economic growth. The mixed-method findings suggest that the enhancement of climate pledges is supported by open political processes that manage to take into account concerns about economic development. Finally, we do not find that structural factors, such as fossil fuel production and physical impacts of climate change constitute a significant barrier to NDC enhancement, although they may determine the initial level of climate ambition in the first NDC.

The deliverable identifies several key results. We establish seven criteria for the assessment of NDC implementation risks, which among our cases include track record, interest groups, resources dedicated to implementation, policy output, embeddedness in legislation, institutional output, and monitoring and enforcement. Based on the criteria, we find that a few of the cases are at higher risk to fail to implement their NDC pledges than others, such as Saudi Arabia, which is categorised as “high risk” for six different criteria. A few countries can be considered “low risk” in terms of implementation risks. For instance, the EU and Norway are the most likely to successfully implement their NDC goals. However, most countries can be considered “low risk” for some criteria and “high risk” for other criteria. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the results of the assessment. First, in line with studies indicating an “implementation gap”, it is highly unlikely that NDCs will be fully implemented. Our selected cases exhibit implementation risks for various criteria, calling into question the likelihood of achieving the 1.5°C goal. Second, although NDCs have been gradually updated, they still are lacking in many crucial regards, such as access to information on government budgeting for climate action. This makes it more to assess and compare countries’ financial investments in climate action. Thus, there is a need for more research that captures funding for the implementation.

This deliverable analyses transformation opportunities, barriers and policy options in about 10 countries for each of the four sectors energy-intensive industries, transport, buildings, and agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU). The analysis shows that while there generally is the potential to achieve sufficient emission reductions to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement, mobilisation of this potential is impeded by strong barriers across all sectors. In addition, existing policies are nowhere nearly strong enough to overcome these barriers and mobilise mitigation opportunities. The sector reports contain options to strengthen policies for each target country as well as cross-country comparisons of results.

Achieving the decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries (EIIs) by mid-century is technically possible and essential to achieving the aims of the Paris Agreement. However, decarbonising EIIs, such as steel, cement, chemicals, and aluminium, faces significant economic, political, and structural barriers across all levels of governance. This study systematically analyses national sectoral decarbonisation barriers, enablers and policies for 13 major EII producing countries to assess if their respective national policy frameworks are fit for advancing the decarbonisation of EIIs in line with Paris-compatible pathways. The analysis is based on case studies that systematically map national sectoral mitigation barriers, enablers and policies conducted or reviewed by national or sectoral experts.

Reaching the Paris Agreement goal requires transformative systemic change in all main emitting sec- tors of the economy, including transport. Nonetheless, despite the fact that freight represents 8% of global greenhouse gas emissions, current strategies to diminish this sub-sector’s emissions are far from being sufficient to meet this objective. In this paper, we present an integrated approach to analyze national freight decarbonization actions and attempt to show through a cross-country comparison that this comprehensive tool can be used to guide public policies. This approach uses different existing analytical frameworks: it is based on a pathway design framework which allows the consideration of all drivers of change, which is combined with an analysis of feasibility conditions and then of policy instruments.

Buildings are crucial in climate mitigation due to their significant share in final energy consumption and GHG emissions. However, the sector decarbonisation has been slow to move. This study aims to identify key barriers to building decarbonisation and analyse policy instruments addressing these barriers. In addition, the study also briefly discussed the contribution of building decarbonisation to SDGs as enablers for taking up the decarbonisation measures.

The contribution of the AFOLU sector for achieving net zero by mid-century is critical and few countries will rely on the sector to achieve the goal of the Paris Agreement. However, the sector faces significant economic, political and structural barriers across all levels of governance. To address these and materialize the potential of the sector, far-reaching and comprehensive public policies and support are needed. This paper analyses the national policy frameworks of 10 countries where the AFOLU sector, in particular Forest, seem to be considered in their NDCs and will play a role for achieving net zero by mid-century. First, we identify general sectoral mitigation barriers, challenges and opportunities and analyse how these are manifested at national level, based on country case studies conducted or reviewed by national experts. Second, we consider if national policy frameworks are fit for purpose of the AFOLU sector to contribute to country LTS targets.

The People’s Republic of China is a country located in eastern Asian on the western Pacific coast, with a vast land area of 9.6 million square kilometers and a huge population of 1.4 billion in 2022. As a rapidly developing nation, China is facing significant challenges in reconciling economic growth, improvement of people’s livelihoods, and sustainable environmental development. To address the crisis of global climate change, China has committed to reaching peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.

EU countries have agreed to set the EU27 on course to becoming the first climate-neutral economy by 2050 while they have set the EU’s NDC target to reduce its Greenhouse Gas emissions by at least 55% in 2030 below 1990 levels. To reach the 2030 NDC climate target – reducing the net GHG emissions by 55% from 1990 levels – the pace of emission reductions will need to pick up and almost triple the average annual reduction achieved over the last decade. In contrast to the mitigation efforts until today that largely focused on energy supply, the most significant cuts in emissions in this decade are needed in buildings and transport. To achieve climate neutrality by 2050 the EU27 needs to aim for the following:

• First and foremost, electrification of demand sectors to the extent possible is of high priority combined with renewable-based electricity.
• Greening the remaining fuel mix to decarbonise hard-to-electrify sectors & uses.
• Abate remaining emissions (via Carbon Capture and Storage and negative emission technologies).

India’s Long-term low carbon Development Strategies is based upon an economy-wide multiple objectives approach, including integrating dimensions of gender equity and inclusion of marginalized and vulnerable groups, that consciously seeks to move to a low-carbon path of development. To become Aatmanirbhar Bharat (Self Reliant India), the document systematically outlines the current policies in electricity, industry (energy intensive and light industries), transport (passenger and freight), buildings (residential and commercial), agriculture and forestry sector. Development priorities of eradicating poverty and hunger, providing housing to all, increasing employment as well as income needs to be supported by financial aspects. The updated NDC includes push for energy storage and launch of green hydrogen policy for India. Estimated cumulative investments based on numerous sources range from 6-10 trillion USD between 2015 and 2030.

The primary transformation for South Africa in long term decarbonization is a transition in the power sector,. This transition is primarily a domestic policy matter and outside the global sector scope of the NDC-Aspects project. It is mentioned here to set the scene. The electricity system will need to transition away from coal power generation to renewable energy electricity generation with solar PV and wind technologies. South Africa’s grid is highly carbon intensive because of the large coal power station fleet powering the grid. However, these plants are mostly old with many nearing their end of life. At the same time, South Africa is blessed with renewable energy resources – amongst the best in the world. A transition to renewable electricity generation with solar and wind technologies is economical and will drastically lower the country’s emissions.

The main emitting sectors in the U.S. are transportation, electricity generation, and industry. Transportation has become the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions, representing 28% of all U.S. emissions in 2022. Emissions from this sector have been increasing in the past three decades despite efficiency improvements due to an increase in travel demand. The power sector makes up 25% of emissions in 2022. Emissions from this sector have been steadily decreasing since 1990 due to market and regulatory mechanisms that have been driving down coal generation. Industry emissions, which account for 23% of overall emissions, have also been on the decline thanks to a shift to less energy-intensive manufacturing products.1 However, it has not been declining at the same pace as other sectors, given that many industry decarbonization options are not commercially available yet

•  Australia’s per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions decreased from 30.8 tCO2e (carbon dioxide equivalents) in 2005 to 18.6 tCO2e in 2022 by 60%, due to a significant decline in coal combustion and reduced emissions from Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, which started to turn negative in 2016.
• The power sector was responsible for more than 49% of all energy related CO2 emissions in 2022, followed by transport (about 24%), industry (20%) and buildings (7.3%).
• With the current Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), Australia increased the 2030 target from 26%-28% GHG emission reduction compared to 2005 (published in 2015) to 43% (published in 2022). In Dec. 2023, the federal government stated, based on projections, that Australia is broadly on track to meet this target.
• Ambitious scenarios focus primarily on a transformation in mining and industry through new processes based on renewable energies (RES), the decarbonization of the electricity supply and efficiency measures and strategies for electrification in all areas of application (especially transport and buildings).
• The transformation in industry involves phasing out the mining of fossil fuels for domestic consumption and exports, ramping up the extraction of key raw materials for the energy transition and introducing a renewable energy supply in the basic materials industry.
• Improved standards and regulations are required in the building sector, as there is virtually no insulation and inefficient electrical air conditioning and heating systems are widespread.
• Australia’s first fuel efficiency standard for vehicles is likely to enter into force 2025. But not as ambitious as the EU’s CO2 emission performance standards for cars and vans.
• The Integrated System Plan (ISP) outlines pathways for the electricity sector focusing on the required new transmission, generation, and storage across the National Electricity Market (NEM). The 2024 draft shows a coal phase-out by 2034 and a rapid uptake of renewables – mainly solar photovoltaics.

• Due to population and economic growth and the population's rising standard of living, energy consumption in Brazil will continue to increase significantly in the future. Thus, the challenges of a climate-neutral economy and society are great and require a balance between sustainability and development.
• Brazil's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounted for 2.4 Giga tons of CO2e in 2021, per capita emissions were around 8 tons of CO2e. Brazil’s emissions come mainly from land use, agriculture and livestock.
• With the current Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), Brazil has committed to reducing GHG emissions by over 53% by 2030 compared to 2005 and to achieving net zero emissions by 2050.
• Brazil is one of the world's main producers of biofuels with the industrial potential to increase this option as well as to produce large quantities of electricity-based hydrogen and synthetic fuels.
• Despite the great potential of renewable energy sources, the lack of infrastructure is a major obstacle to the implementation of decarbonization measures in the building, transport and industrial sectors.
• There is still no long-term strategy for achieving the targets that have been set; further and consistent efforts are required from politicians and the economy in order to implement available reduction options.
• Ambitious transformation scenarios focus primarily on reducing emissions by halting deforestation, reforestation and projects to reduce emissions from soils and agriculture. Renewable energies are to be expanded to cover the additional future energy demand. Today's emissions are to be offset partly by substituting fossil fuels and partly by negative emissions from the AFOLU sector.

• In the light of Colombia’s absolute emission target of maximal 169 MtCO2eq in 2030, the reduction in GHG emissions should become a dedicated target of actual policy instead of only being a side effect of national policies and regulations, following a clear and sustainable long-term development strategy. Economic and social development goals should be merged with environmental and climate goals.
• As the value of fossil fuel exports declines in the future, the transition to a low-carbon economy is a chance to have a positive impact on both the resilience of the economy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
• Key to a just transition is a gradual but unwavering phase-out of the fossil industry, giving time to diversify the economy, the internal consumption and the fiscal collection of taxes. Revenues from the fossil fuel industry should be used in a targeted manner to support the just and sustainable transition of the economy.

• The 2024 National Climate Change Mitigation Plan of Ecuador (PLANMICC) is the first long-term integrated strategy to guide the mitigation actions up to 2070 in energy, agriculture, LULUCF, residues and industrial processes. It seeks to achieve the ambitious target to reduce 70% of annual GHG emissions by 2070, in comparison to the BAU scenario.
• A national implementation strategy is needed to achieve the goals of PLANMICC. This is only possible if all institutions, policy makers, entrepreneurs and society as a whole embrace it. Thus, education at all levels and communication strategies are required.
• The second NDC should propose initiatives aligned with the long-term goals and sectoral decarbonization pathways, with concrete interim targets in 2030 and 2035.
• One of the main barriers to advance in decarbonization targets is financing. Thus, the public and private sectors need to agree on the boundary conditions for participation in this endeavor. Capacity building is required in governmental institutions for the application and utilization of international green funds.

• Iran is a signatory to the Paris Agreement, while being one of the few countries that hasn’t officially ratified the treaty. Iran is the largest GHG emitting country in this position, accounting for 2% of the total global emissions.
• The unconditional NDC target of Iran is reducing GHG emissions by 4% in 2030, compared to the business as usual (BAU) scenario, while it also has set the conditional target of 12% reduction of GHG emissions, in comparison to BAU. Iran has still not submitted a long-term target (LTT).
• The electrification of the Iranian economy and the deployment of renewable energy are necessary to significantly cut CO2 emissions, improve energy efficiency and meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.

• Japan is a major economy located in East Asia part of the Pacific Ring of Fire, and the Japanese islands are prone to destructive earthquakes and tsunamis. The Fukushima disaster in 2011 had a major impact on Japan’s development and future energy policy.
• Japan is a founding Party of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) and has ratified the Paris Agreement since 2016. The country has submitted its Intended National Determined Contribution in 2016 and in the updated version of 2021 Japan made a commitment for more ambitious 2030 targets, while in 2020 the country declared a net-zero emissions target for 2050.
• The country is relatively poor in natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals, and the energy sector is heavily dependent on imports, making energy security a national priority. In 2022, Japan's energy supply relied on net imports for 90 percent.
• The decarbonization pathway of Japan requires significant investments in renewable energy infrastructure, advancements in energy efficiency, and nuclear power plants and relevant infrastructure , and the adoption of stringent emissions reduction policies across all sectors of the economy to enable sectoral electrification and decarbonization of the energy supply.

• A change of perspective in climate governance, involving the whole of Mexican government and society, is essential for effective climate action. Viewing the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as an opportunity rather than an obligation would help in this process and enable appropriate actions.
• A full energy transition is needed in all activities and sectors, mostly towards green electricity. This also includes the controlled phase-out of the oil and gas industry on the long term and a diversification of the economy.
• The commitment to a full transition, not only in the energy and industry sectors, but especially in urban transport, will bring about an improvement in the quality of life for all citizens.

• Morocco has taken several positive steps on climate action, including a substantially enhanced NDC in 2021. In its long-term strategy (LTS), Morocco speaks of its intention to achieve net zero within the century, but the government has not announced a specific net-zero target year or any other more detailed information
• Morocco remains heavily dependent on coal, and the government has announced plans to expand fossil gas and LNG infrastructure. It needs to commit to a coal phase out if it hopes to achieve the conditional NDC target but would need international support to do so.
• To ensure that the NDC targets are met, and climate action is further strengthened, Morocco could commit to a rapid coal phase-out from the power mix, strengthen its renewable energy targets to ensure that they are in line with the 1.5°C limit of the Paris Agreement and stop investing in coal and fossil gas.

• Nigeria is a founding Party of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) and has ratified the Paris Agreement since 2017. The country has submitted its Intended National Determined Contribution in 2015 and an updated version in 2021 retaining its original ambitious targets despite the initial overestimation of the baseline scenario.
• The electricity infrastructure of Nigeria is underdeveloped with frequent power outages and more than a third of the population does not have access to electricity and depends heavily on the use of traditional biomass.
• The decarbonization pathway of Nigeria relies on the uptake of renewable energy sources in the major emitting sectors of transportation and electricity supply.

• In the overall picture of the Norwegian climate protection ambition, the Climate Action Tracker indicated an overall rating as “almost sufficient” on Dec 2022.
• However, despite a long history and present mechanisms of Norwegian policy for climate protection, still considerably stronger policies and finance as well as effective implementation will be needed to meet the -55% NDC target for 2030 (Climate Action Tracker, 2022).
• For 2050, Norway has stated a 90-95% reduction target for its gross domestic greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), committing to become a “low emission society” in 2050. The GHG removals by LULUCF are expected to remain at the current considerable level of 15-20 MtCO2e per year at a total current annual emission level of around 50 MtCO2e. Thus, with a gross 90-95% emission reduction target, Norway will be a net GHG sink, including LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry).
• On the policy side, Norway demonstrates how a country can adopt and be part of European climate protection schemes like the EU-ETS without being an EU Member State. Other countries may adopt best-practices from the Norwegian case.
• Norway’s domestic GHG mitigation targets and efforts are counteracted by the Norwegian efforts to still expand its large oil and natural gas exploration and exporting sector (Climate Action Tracker, 2022). With the “EU energy crisis” from the Russian invasion in Ukraine in 2022 and, accordingly, Russian oil and gas supply being omitted as a crucial provider of the EU, the Norwegian oil and gas supplier Equinor ASA (former Statoil ASA) took over the role of the one predominant EU natural gas supplier.

• Russia is a signatory to the Paris Agreement, and has formalized its commitment to the international treaty, by ratifying it in 2019. Russia has also set a long-term target of net zero emissions by 2060.
• Russia is a fossil energy superpower, with the country being ranked in top places of oil, natural gas and coal production, and the Russian economy relying massively on hydrocarbon exports.
• The NDC and Long-term climate targets of Russia can be achieved, driven by the reduced use of fossil fuels combined with electrification of demand sectors, as well as the uptake of renewable energy sources and hydrogen. By implementing ambitious climate policies, Russia will be able to decarbonize its economy, and achieve the long-term target of net zero emissions by 2060.

• Saudi Arabia has ratified the Paris Agreement, aiming to reduce GHG emissions by 278 MtCO2e annually by 2030. Saudi officials have announced a net zero target for 2060, without specifying a clear plan, timeline, pathway, and scope for this aspiration.
• Saudi Arabia is currently ranked as the world's largest oil exporter,, with oil exports expected to reach to USD 326 billion in 2022. The fossil fuel sector accounts for approximately 40% of the Saudi Arabia’s GDP, highlighting the need for economic diversification.
• Greenhouse gas emissions can be drastically reduced in Saudi Arabia through effective climate policies, such as the electrification of demand sectors, rapid deployment of renewable energy, the use of hydrogen and alternative fuels like biodiesel.

• Türkiye became Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2004 and to the Kyoto Protocol in 2009. Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021 and in October of the same year announced the 2053 carbon neutrality goal.
• The decarbonization of an emerging, highly industrialized economy like Türkiye, with sustained rates of economic growth and rising population is feasible, albeit challenging.
• The implementation of NDC and long-term decarbonization should be guided by targeted policies and regulatory framework that encourages investments in energy efficiency, renewable power and disruptive clean energy technologies. The sectors that offer the biggest “bang for the buck” are the buildings and the power supply sectors.
• The role of hydrogen, as an energy carrier, is crucial for decarbonizing energy uses. It takes advantage of existing infrastructure and is used in processes hard to decarbonize, such as steel and cement industry.

• Vietnam’s per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions increased from 2.3 tCO2e (carbon dioxide equivalents) in 2005 to 4.8 tCO2e in 2021 by a factor of four, due to a significant increase in coal combustion and increased emissions from Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), which started to turn positive in 2001.

• The power sector was responsible for 49% of all energy related CO2 emissions in 2021, followed by industry (about 38%), and transport (12%).

• Vietnam raises the ambition of the 2030 target and commits to reduce its emissions by 15.8% (unconditional) and by 43.5% (conditional) by 2030 compared to a ‘Business-As-Usual’ (BAU) scenario. To achieve the more ambitious ’conditional’ targets, Vietnam is calling for external financial support for mitigation technologies. The ‘unconditional’ are defined as targets that Vietnam can achieve without external financial support.

• Under the BAU scenario, GHG emissions increase by 57% from 528 MtCO2e in 2020 (excluding LULUCF) to 927.9 MtCO2e.in 2030. The 43.5% GHG reduction (conditional) freezes emissions on 2021 level.

• The ‘Eight Power Development Plan’ (PDP8) represents the most important policy to increase renewable power generation and reduce the dependence from (partly imported) coal for power generation.

• Vietnam’s total installed capacity of the power system is planned to increase from 80 GW in 2023 to 150 GW in 2030.

• The capacity of renewable sources (including wind, solar, and biomass) is expected to double from 21 GW (accounting for around 26.9% of the system) in 2023 to 42 GW (accounting for around 28.5% of the system) in 2030.

• A new rural electrification program aims to provide electricity to 2,478 small- and medium-sized pumping stations in the Mekong Delta region, while also extending electricity access to remote islands through national grid connections or renewable energy sources.

• Around 13 GW of planned new coal power plant capacity is cancelled under PDP8, but eleven new coal power plants with a capacity of 13 GW will still complete construction

This part of deliverable D5.3 analyses how international cooperation can enhance mitigation efforts in three sectors – steel, freight transport and AFOLU. This analysis builds on the deep dives and economy-wide scenarios which were conducted in Tasks 5.2 and 5.3, as part of Work Package 5 and further develop the sectoral arguments on international cooperation in the aforementioned three sectors. The analysis was drafted in a report format in the context of the Deep Decarbonisation Pathways (DDP) initiative by IDDRI in order to enable publication at a relevant time for international processes, namely parallel to the finalization of the First Global Stocktake. The report can be also found on the initiative's website: https://ddpinitiative.org/ddp-annual-report-2023/.

The ongoing impacts of sanctions against Russia after the full scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022, coupled with the fundamental transformation of Russian economy, logistical challenges, sectoral changes, and price fluctuations, pose a considerable influence on the Russian forest sector, including forest management, production of wood-based products, domestic and export supplies of timber. The Russian forests play an important role for the global environment and climatic system with net carbon removals by Russian forests reaching about 500-700 MtCO2 per year. The anthropogenic and climate change impacts on Russian forests are and will further be exacerbated by the consequences of long-lasting sanctions and associated socio-economic turmoils in Russia. The objective of this study is to conduct an in-depth policy relevant analysis on how impacts of sanctions and dramatic changes of Russian economy, logistics, sectoral and price turbulences can affect the Russian forests, forest management practices, production and demand for timber and, through that, the carbon sequestration potential of forests. The author of this study should remain anonymous.

This report assesses sectoral governance gaps and potentials to identify means to improve global governance to enhance the realisation of transformational sectoral pathways across four hard-to-abate sectors, namely Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU), energy-intensive industry, buildings, and transport. The analysis is captured in five outputs (four article manuscripts and one policy brief). The manuscripts can be found below as deliverables 6.1a-d. The policy brief is named "Article 6 and CORSIA after Glasgow: Ready for take-off?" and can be found on the project website here.

Land-based activities are increasingly acknowledged for their important ongoing and potential contributions to the Paris Agreement’s mitigation target of reaching carbon neutrality in the second half of this century by reducing emissions and increasing removals from the sector, as well as by its capacity to produce biomass to substitute carbon-intensive products. Land use also plays an important role in short- and medium-term mitigation targets set out in countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and 2030 strategies and plans. At the same time, the land is a critical resource for multiple developmental and environmental objectives, providing food, fodder, fibre, fuel, and a multitude of other goods and ecosystem services that are fundamental to human well-being. Due to its finite nature, land is subject to competition among these different uses and objectives, and mid to long-term planning of land use and enhancing governance is therefore fundamental to ensure socially and environmentally sound arbitrages among them. As ecosystems (managed and unmanaged) are increasingly impacted by climate change, it is therefore needed that mitigation measures are compatible with adaptation measures. Overall, to achieve sustainability in the sector is also necessary the preservation of other ecosystem services and respect for local communities’ rights, which requires a multiscale and fit-for-purpose governance structure. Despite some recent progress, governance structures and plans rarely address the multiple objectives listed above. For the purpose of the paper, the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) Agriculture, Forest, and other Land Uses (AFOLU) sector approach will be used. This paper will assess the AFOLU governance instruments beyond the domestic scale to enhance ambition and implementation of NDCs by acting in the sector while integrating environmental and developmental objectives other than mitigation, and point out the barriers and possible solutions to the governance gaps that are identified.

To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement the deep decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries (EIIs) by mid-century is essential. However, their transition is hampered by several crucial economic and political barriers, such as limited availability of mitigation technologies, high capital investment needs and long lifecycles, and strong global competition. Global governance and sector-specific initiatives offer great potential to address these barriers and accelerate EII decarbonisation globally – a potential that has so far remained underexploited, however. This article identifies and assesses in detail options of global governance for closing existing governance gaps and advancing the decarbonisation of the main EIIs (i.e., steel, cement and concrete, chemicals, and aluminium). To this end, it proceeds in three steps. It first determines the theoretical potential of international cooperation to address barriers and challenges to the decarbonisation of EIIs along six governance functions, i.e. signal and guidance, rule setting, transparency and accountability, means of implementation, knowledge, and learning, and orchestration and coordination. It then identifies existing gaps in the global governance of decarbonising EIIs, by comparing the theoretical potential of global governance with the existing supply of global governance across the six functions. It finds that recently established global sectoral initiatives provide a promising basis for further enhancing governance, in particular regarding the functions of signal and guidance, means of implementation, as well as a rule set. On this basis, the article proceeds to identify and assess concrete options for enhancing the global climate governance of EIIs to address the gaps identified and drive forward the transition. It analyses if and how reforming existing institutions can address the identified governance gaps, before discussing the possible creation of new institutions to address the remaining gaps. Existing institutions offer a good starting to advance global governance on many functions, but a new institution can significantly enhance existing efforts and is required to address issues regarding international competition and carbon leakage and the harmonisation of standards for near-zero emission basic materials. The analysis provides priorities and ‘feasible’ steps towards a better exploitation of the potential of global governance for the decarbonisation of EIIs that can drive forward the sector's transition to climate neutrality.

Emissions from the buildings sector account for 21% of global GHG emissions. This paper aims to analyse the potential of global climate governance to promote the decarbonisation of this sector. The paper proceeds in four steps. First, the paper summarise existing knowledge on which barriers are impeding decarbonisation of the buildings sector as well as opportunities that may be leveraged. Second, the paper discusses how global governance may help with overcoming these barriers and mobilising potentials (“governance potential”). Third, the paper maps out the existing landscape of international institutions that are active in the buildings sector and discusses to what extent these institutions have already been able to exploit the governance potential identified in the preceding step. This discussion results in an identification of governance gaps and unexploited potential. Finally, the paper discusses options for filling the identified gaps and mobilising unexploited potential.

Global governance and cooperation in the buildings sector are generally difficult given its mostly localised supply chains, lack of exposure to international trade, and highly differentiated needs in relation to geography and climate. The paper nonetheless identifies a number of potential avenues for global climate governance, but this potential has been exploited only to a limited extent. The sector was not even mentioned in recent outcomes of institutions such as the G7 or the Major Economies Forum. While the challenge of providing climate-friendly cooling is governed with clear targets, rules, and transparency mechanisms under the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, regarding the buildings sector as a whole, there is no central institution, no strong government-backed signal on the need to decarbonise, and also is little rule-setting. The potential to provide transparency and accountability of countries’ actions also has been exploited only to a very low extent. Regarding means of implementation, while substantial resources seem to be provided, there is a lack of data on actual needs. IPCC and IEA consider that investments need to grow by a factor of 3-4 by 2030 to get onto a Paris-compatible trajectory.

Several already existing institutions could in theory help to close the governance gaps identified but in practice, all have limitations, such as the diverging interests among the parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and the need to achieve consensus. The best way forward may therefore be a coalition of ambitious countries and other others, such as a “Breakthrough” in the buildings sector, that draws on the strengths of existing institutions. To add value to the existing institutional landscape, such a “Breakthrough” should include an ambitious global target or roadmap as well as ambitious individual targets and pledges to increase means of implementation for developing countries. The GlobalABC and the IEA could track implementation, as the IEA is already doing case with the existing Glasgow Breakthroughs. Successive COP presidencies could use the annual COP sessions as a platform and occasion to demand demonstration of clear progress. In addition, if country members included their Breakthrough pledges in their NDCs, they would thereby be subject to the transparency mechanisms of the Paris Agreement.

However, the success of such as “Breakthrough” is far from assured given that so far several calls for building decarbonisation commitments by governments gained only a handful of signatories. A fallback option would be to strengthen the GlobalABC in terms of its membership and administrative capacity.

Notwithstanding its overall importance, the United Nations (UN) climate change regime has so far played a limited role in driving sectoral transformations toward climate neutrality. However, the challenges and opportunities for sectoral transformations, as well as the need for and potential for international governance, differ across varying sectoral systems. Land transport is a major emitter of greenhouse gas emissions and one of the most difficult sectors to decarbonise. Emissions from the land transport sector are projected to rise, with total transport activity expected to more than double by 2050 against 2015 levels (International Transport Forum, 2021). Drawing on a review of available policy documents and secondary literature, this paper assesses the extent to which international governance can promote the transformation of land transport towards sustainability and decarbonisation. It first identifies the key challenges and barriers to sectoral decarbonisation inland transport, as well as any unexploited potentials. The paper then examines the potential of international cooperation to address these barriers and mobilise any potentials, mapped against six key governance functions, namely: (1) guidance and signal, (2) rules and standards, (3) transparency and accountability, (4) means of implementation (5) knowledge and learning, and (6) orchestration and coordination. The paper subsequently analyses the existing governance landscape, to identify to what extent current institutions have been exploiting these governance potentials. The paper finds that the overall international governance potential in the area of sustainable mobility remains underexploited. The paper accordingly explores how international governance may be enhanced in the land transport sector and offers some concrete options to this end, including institutional reform as well as the potential creation of a new institution in the form of a climate club.

This report summarises two manuscripts (which will both be submitted for publication) that analyse the potential for climate clubs in the context of the global political and economic landscape, especially regarding the emerging geopolitical rivalry and increasing industrial policy nationalism. More specifically, the studies provide qualitative insights into different design options of climate clubs and their possible implications. The second manuscript analyses quantitatively the economic and environmental effects of protectionist and nationalist industrial policies.

In response to the limitations and failings of the multilateral UN climate change law regime, a range of new and dynamic climate governance arrangements have emerged. This includes minilateral ‘climate clubs’, which enable a subset of countries to tackle climate change beyond the UNFCCC. While proposed as a solution to move international climate policy forward, depending on their specific design, climate clubs could raise implications from the perspective of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) that is enshrined in the climate regime. Accordingly, this paper aims to analyse different design options of climate clubs through the lens of CBDR-RC. First, it explains the general rationale for climate clubs and presents a spectrum of key club design features. Second, it conceptualises the principle of CBDR-RC and describes how this has been operationalised. Third, it draws on existing club-like arrangements – namely, the Climate Club launched at COP28, the Clean Energy Ministerial, and the proposed EU-US Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium – to critically examine whether different design options are (likely to be) compatible with the principle of CBDR-RC. Last, the paper explores how differentiation could be woven into the architecture of future climate clubs.

This paper is part of Deliverable 6.3 – Report and academic article manuscripts on sectoral climate clubs (one on the political economy of sectoral climate clubs, and one on the modelling results)

Industrial policy nationalism threatens international collaboration on climate change mitigation. Using regulatory, fiscal, or trade policies to protect and promote the interests of national industries against external competition may increase the cost of transformation and delay the diffusion of key low-carbon technologies. While we need a technology race against climate change, it needs to be a race in a collaborative spirit in which all contestants encourage each other to perform at their best. But a race in the spirit of geopolitical rivalry may cost us the climate.

This paper is part Deliverable 6.3 – Report and academic article manuscripts on sectoral climate clubs (one on the political economy of sectoral climate clubs, and one on the modelling results)

This deliverable assesses the Global Stocktake (GST) potential to promote transitions of sectoral systems and how its outcome fulfills this potential. It draws on research in socio-technical transitions and international institutions to develop an evaluation framework. Literature and stakeholder submissions highlight how an effective GST could support transitions. While the GST decision breaks ground by calling for transitioning away from fossil fuels and setting renewable energy and efficiency targets, it lacks strong legal language, clear follow-up mechanisms, and sufficient financial support for developing nations. Despite these limitations, the GST sets a new benchmark for climate governance and empowers those seeking bolder action within governments and businesses. And from a conceptual perspective, a system-focused approach has arguably proven its worth as a concept to effectively dissect the complex challenge of climate change.

The main aim of this deliverable is to document the progress of the policy paper series during the first reporting period. All papers produced so far were already published individually on the project’s website and advertised in the project newsletter and on social media. Most outputs of work packages 1 to 6 will consist of research reports and manuscripts for academic journals. The objective of the policy paper series is therefore to distil policy-relevant results in a more digestible format targeted at policymakers and stakeholders. So far, two policy papers were published, plus a submission to the Global Stocktake (GST) process of the UNFCCC. As the project is starting to produce more research outputs, there will correspondingly be more material to translate into policy papers.